Philip Gotthelf v. Toyota Mtr Sales USA by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-21-2013 
Philip Gotthelf v. Toyota Mtr Sales USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Philip Gotthelf v. Toyota Mtr Sales USA" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 827. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/827 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-2871 
_____________ 
 
PHILIP GOTTHELF, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; NATHAN 
GUEDALIA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, 
       Appellants 
 
v. 
 
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., a California corporation authorized to do 
business in New Jersey; TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA, INC., a California 
corporation authorized to do  business in New York; TOYOTA MOTOR 
CORPORATION, a Japanese corporation 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT 
OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-10-cv-04429) 
District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 18, 2013 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: May 21, 2013) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
Philip Gotthelf (“Gotthelf”) and Nathan Guedalia (“Guedalia”), (collectively, 
2 
 
“Appellants”),1 appeal the District Court’s Order dismissing their Complaint under 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6).  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm the District Court’s Order. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts. 
This case is related to two other class action suits, Collado v. Toyota Motor Sales, 
U.S.A., Inc. (No. 10-cv-03113) (the “Collado action”), and Fixler v. Toyota Motor Sales, 
U.S.A., Inc. (No. 10-cv-03124) (the “Fixler action”).  The Collado and Fixler actions 
were consolidated (the “Collado-Fixler action”) in the Central District of California (the 
“California District Court”), and were settled on behalf of a nationwide class on October 
17, 2011.
2
   
On August 30, 2010, approximately sixteen months after the Collado action was 
filed, Appellants filed their putative class action Complaint (the “Gotthelf action”) in the 
District of New Jersey, on behalf of themselves and “[a]ll persons in the United States 
                                                 
1
 Appellants also purport to bring their claims on behalf of a putative class of all 
others similarly situated. 
2
 The Collado action was filed in the Central District of California on May 1, 
2009, and three months later the District Court sua sponte ordered that the action be 
transferred to the Southern District of New York because Collado was a New York 
resident.  On February 16, 2010, the Fixler action was filed in the Southern District of 
New York.  The District Court for the Southern District of New York, on April 19, 2010, 
ordered both actions transferred to the Central District of California, where the cases 
were consolidated. 
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who own or lease, or who have owned or leased, model years [2006-2009] Toyota Prius 
motor vehicles equipped with an optional factory-installed HID Headlamp System 
(‘Nationwide Class’).”3  (App. 100.)   
A. Factual Allegations in the Gotthelf Action 
The allegations in the Complaint center around an alleged defect in the Toyota 
Prius’s optional, factory-installed, high-intensity discharge (“HID”) headlamp system, 
which caused the HID headlamp bulbs to stop working without warning (“Unexpected 
Extinguishment”).  This is the same defect that was at issue in the Collado-Fixler action.  
Appellants claim that the Unexpected Extinguishment was unreasonably dangerous 
because one or both headlamps could extinguish while driving.    
On May 6, 2009, the National Highway Transportation Safety Association 
(“NHTSA”) notified Toyota that it had opened an investigation into HID headlamp 
failures in the 2006 and 2007 model year Toyota Prius, based on 338 reports it had 
received of such failures.  Appellants include in their Complaint several of the customer 
reports filed with the NHTSA, the earliest of which is dated July 1, 2007.  Appellants 
also allege that the NHTSA investigation uncovered approximately 2,200 consumer 
complaints regarding failed HID headlamps, some filed with the NHTSA and some with 
Toyota, and that additionally, as of September 2009, Toyota had received about 27,600 
                                                 
3
 Appellants originally included owners of 2010 Toyota Priuses in their 
Complaint.  The District Court determined that the 2010 Toyota Prius did not come 
equipped with HID headlights, and Appellants did not object to the District Court’s 
exclusion of 2010 vehicle owners from the putative class.  
4 
 
warranty claims on the issue.  The NHTSA investigation found that in most cases of 
Unexpected Extinguishment, one bulb would extinguish at a time, and that toggling the 
headlamp switch on and off would temporarily restore lighting, thereby making it 
feasible to get the vehicle to a repair facility.  In August 2009, the NHTSA closed its 
investigation, concluding that “a safety defect trend [had] not been identified at [that] 
time.”  (App. 566, 803.) 
In December 2009, Toyota initiated a Customer Support Program, offering to fully 
reimburse owners of 2006-2009 Priuses who had replaced the headlight electronic control 
unit (“ECU”), and to partially reimburse customers who had replaced one or more of the 
HID headlamp bulbs.  It sent the Customer Support letter to customers on December 28, 
2009.  In the letter, Toyota stated that the HID headlamp failure occurred toward the end 
of the HID bulb’s useful life, and explained that replacing the HID bulbs was “sufficient 
to curtail the intermittent operation.”  (App. 263.)  The letter also gave customers several 
suggestions on how to extend the life of the HID bulbs.  Customers wishing to participate 
in the Support Program were required to submit claims no later than March 31, 2010. 
Gotthelf purchased a new Toyota Prius on April 28, 2006, and Guedalia leased a 
new Toyota Prius on August 30, 2006.  Each paid more for the optional HID headlamp 
system.  The HID headlamps were covered under Toyota’s 36-month or 36,000-mile 
warranty. 
One of Gotthelf’s HID headlamps first experienced Unexpected Extinguishment in 
October 2009, after his Prius had been driven 49,907 miles and was no longer under 
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warranty.  When Gotthelf replaced the driver’s side HID headlamp bulb, the Toyota 
representative informed Gotthelf that Toyota was aware of the problem with the HID 
headlamps.  In November 2009, the passenger side headlamp began to experience 
Unexpected Extinguishment, but as of the filing of the Complaint, Gotthelf had not 
replaced it.   
Unexpected Extinguishment first occurred in Guedalia’s passenger side HID 
headlamp in July 2009, after his Prius had been driven 59,021 miles and was no longer 
under warranty.  In August 2009, Guedalia replaced one HID headlamp bulb, and in 
February 2010, he replaced the other.  Both Gotthelf and Guedalia received Toyota’s 
December 28, 2009 Customer Support letter. 
In the Complaint, Appellants argue that Toyota had knowledge of the HID 
headlamp defect and concealed the defect from its customers.  Appellants allege that 
Toyota marketed the more expensive HID headlamps as superior to standard halogen 
bulbs, claiming that the HID headlamps provide better visibility, use less power, and last 
longer than halogen bulbs.  They claim that Toyota had knowledge of the defect in the 
HID headlamps as early as 2005 and failed to inform customers of the alleged latent 
defect.  Appellants provide no factual support for this assertion, and the earliest customer 
complaint they include in their Complaint is dated July 1, 2007.  They also claim that 
Toyota has concealed the defect and that the December 28, 2009 Customer Support letter 
was misleading, in that it failed to acknowledge any latent product defect and only 
partially reimbursed some customers.  Appellants bring claims under New Jersey law for 
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violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“NJCFA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:81 et 
seq., common law fraud, breach of express warranty, and breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.   
B. Procedural History of the Collado-Fixler and Gotthelf Actions 
When Appellants filed their Complaint, the Collado-Fixler action, which sought to 
represent the same nationwide class, was already pending in the Central District of 
California, and the parties were already engaged in settlement discussions.   
On September 17, 2010, Appellants filed a motion with the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”), seeking to have all the “Unexpected Extinguishment” 
cases, including Collado-Fixler, transferred to the District of New Jersey for consolidated 
and coordinated pretrial proceedings.  The Panel denied the motion on November 30, 
2010, because the Panel found that “the parties in the Central District of California 
actions are on the cusp of a settlement,” and “[t]here are more suitable mechanisms in 
place by which class members can object to or opt out of a class settlement.”  (App. 668.)  
Appellants also filed a motion with the California District Court to intervene in the 
Collado-Fixler action, which was denied. 
On December 30, 2010, the parties in the Collado-Fixler action reached a formal 
settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”), which purported to settle all claims 
related to the HID headlamps for owners of model years 2006-2009 Toyota Priuses.  On 
January 10, 2011, the California District Court approved the Collado-Fixler plaintiffs’ 
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motion for certification of a settlement class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
4
  The court 
ordered that the class be given notice of the pendency of the action and the terms of the 
proposed settlement.  Class members were given the opportunity to opt out of the 
Settlement Agreement and to file objections.  Gotthelf opted out of the class settlement.  
Guedalia did not opt out, but filed an objection to the Settlement Agreement, claiming 
that the settlement was premature and insufficient to address the class members’ claims. 
The California District Court held a fairness hearing on October 17, 2011, and 
approved the Settlement Agreement, finding it “fair, adequate, and reasonable” under 
Fed. R. Civ. P 23(e).  (App. 421-23.)  The District Court considered the arguments raised 
by the objectors (including Guedalia), and found that they raised “no significant concerns 
that would preclude approval of the settlement.”  (App. 423.)  Guedalia received and 
cashed a check from the settlement, and did not file an appeal of Settlement Agreement in 
the Ninth Circuit.
5
 
Following final approval of the Settlement Agreement, Toyota moved to dismiss 
the claims in the Gotthelf action.  The District Court granted the motion on May 3, 2012, 
dismissing Guedalia’s and the putative class’s claims on res judicata grounds, and 
                                                 
4
 In its Order approving a settlement class, the California District Court also 
considered, as is required, the factors set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).  See Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997). 
5
 In July 2011, an appeal of the Collado-Fixler action was filed in the Ninth 
Circuit, but only with respect to the California District Court’s award of attorney’s fees. 
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dismissing Gotthelf’s claims for failure to state a claim.6  Appellants filed a timely notice 
of appeal. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
grant of a motion to dismiss.  Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d 
Cir. 2013). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A.  Res Judicata and Due Process 
 Guedalia argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his and the putative 
class’s claims as barred by res judicata, and that he is entitled to collaterally attack the 
Settlement Agreement.  He claims that he and the putative class are not bound by the 
Settlement Agreement because they were denied due process in the resolution of the 
Collado-Fixler action as a result of inadequate representation.
7
 
 It is well-settled that under the doctrine of res judicata, “a judgment pursuant to a 
class settlement can bar later claims based on the allegations underlying the claims in the 
settled class action.”  In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 
                                                 
6
 The District Court dismissed Gotthelf’s claims without prejudice, and granted 
him leave to file an amended complaint.  When Gotthelf failed to file an amended 
complaint, the District Court ordered his claims dismissed with prejudice. 
7
 Because Gotthelf opted out of the class settlement, he is not bound by the 
Settlement Agreement and therefore cannot collaterally attack it. 
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366 (3d Cir. 2001).  To be bound by a class settlement agreement under the principles of 
res judicata, however, the absent class member must have been afforded certain due 
process protections.  In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 
2005).
8
  Generally, “‘there has been a failure of due process only in those cases where it 
cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of 
absent parties who are to be bound by it.’”  Id. (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 
42 (1940)).  In a class action settlement where opt-out rights are given, due process 
requires:  (1) adequate representation by the class representatives, (2) notice of the class 
proceedings, and (3) the opportunity to be heard and to participate in the class 
proceedings.  Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985)).  
Therefore, if the settlement of the Collado-Fixler action comported with due process, res 
judicata will apply to bar Guedalia’s and the putative class’s claims. 
 An absent class member must have some mechanism by which to challenge 
whether his due process rights were upheld during a class action settlement.  See Grimes 
v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1558 (3d Cir. 1994).  “This challenge can 
take the form of an appeal of the class certification itself, a collateral attack on an 
already-certified class, or a Rule 60(b) motion.”  In re Diet Drugs, 431 F.3d at 145 (citing 
In re Real Estate Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d 760, 767 (3d Cir. 
                                                 
8
 The Parties do not dispute that all the elements of res judicata are met here, and 
Guedalia concedes that those elements are “not the important issue.”  (Appellants’ Br. 
19.)  The contested issue is whether the procedures afforded to Guedalia and the putative 
class in the Collado-Fixler action comported with due process. 
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1989)).  Guedalia has chosen to collaterally attack the California District Court’s class 
certification and approval of the Settlement Agreement, rather than to pursue a direct 
appeal.
9
   
  1. Notice and Opportunity to be Heard 
 Guedalia does not, and cannot, challenge that class members were provided with 
sufficient notice and had ample opportunity to be heard and to participate in the class 
proceedings.  Guedalia clearly was apprised of the terms of the settlement, decided not to 
opt out, and exercised his right to object to the class certification and Settlement 
Agreement.  See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 
55 F.3d 768, 791 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that when simultaneous notice of the class 
and the settlement is distributed to the proposed class, class members may object to both 
the terms of the proposed settlement and the class certification itself).  Moreover, the 
District Court considered his specific objections before approving the Settlement 
Agreement.  Guedalia’s only due process objection relates to the adequacy of 
representation.  See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 396 (1996) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Final judgments, however, 
                                                 
9
 Guedalia could have appealed the California District Court’s approval of the 
Settlement Agreement under Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002), which holds 
that an unnamed class member who timely objects to a settlement agreement has standing 
to appeal the approval of the settlement agreement.   
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remain vulnerable to collateral attack for failure to satisfy the adequate representation 
requirement.”).10 
  2. Adequate Representation
11
 
The adequate representation requirement in Rule 23 is designed to assure that 
courts “‘evaluate [both] the named plaintiffs’ and . . . counsel’s ability to fairly and 
adequately represent class interests.’”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 291 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 799).  Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4), 
the district court ensures that no conflict of interest exists between the named plaintiffs’ 
claims and those asserted on behalf of the class, and inquires whether the named 
                                                 
10
 Because Guedalia received notice of the proceedings and failed to exercise an 
opportunity to “opt out,” he consented to the jurisdiction of the California District Court, 
and is bound by the terms of the Settlement Agreement if he received adequate due 
process protections.  See In re Diet Drugs, 431 F.3d at 146 (citing Carlough v. Amchem 
Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
11
 To the extent Guedalia’s challenge could be read as asserting a constitutional 
right to effective or adequate counsel in a class action case, this claim is rejected.  
Supreme Court precedent firmly establishes there is no Due Process right to counsel 
unless the individual may be incarcerated as a result of the litigation.  See, e.g., Lassiter v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); but see Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 
F.3d 948, 959 (2d Cir. 2009) (“An absence of material conflicts of interest between the 
named plaintiffs and their counsel with other class members is central to adequacy and, in 
turn, to due process for absent members of the class.”).  In fact, even when there is a 
possibility that a litigant may lose his liberty at the close of the proceeding, the “Due 
Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel.”  Turner v. 
Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (emphasis in original).  This is not inconsistent 
with our class action collateral attack jurisprudence, in which collateral challenges based 
on “adequacy” generally focus on the adequacy of the class plaintiffs, rather than class 
counsel.  See In re Diet Drugs, 431 F.3d at 145 (due process satisfied by “adequate 
representation by the class representatives, notice of the class proceedings, and the 
opportunity to be heard and participate in the class proceedings”); accord id. at 147-49 
(reviewing due process and adequate representation challenges based on intraclass 
conflicts). 
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plaintiffs have the ability and incentive to vigorously represent the interests of the class.  
See id.   
“‘Although questions concerning the adequacy of class counsel were traditionally 
analyzed under the aegis of the adequate representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) . . . 
those questions have, since 2003, been governed by Rule 23(g).’”  Id. at 292 (quoting 
Sheinberg v. Sorensen, 606 F.3d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2010)).  Rule 23(g) lists several factors 
that district courts consider to determine whether class counsel can “fairly and adequately 
represent the interests of the class.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B).  The list includes: (1) 
“the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action;” 
(2) “counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the 
types of claims asserted in the action;” (3) “counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law;” 
and (4) “the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(g)(1)(A).   
Guedalia has identified no “divergent or conflicting interests” between the named 
plaintiffs and the putative class.  In re Cmty. Bank, 622 F.3d at 291.  All plaintiffs and 
class members were owners or lessees of model years 2006-2009 Toyota Priuses who 
experienced the same malfunction with their HID headlamp system.  Guedalia’s claims 
of inadequate representation focus mainly on the adequacy of representation by class 
counsel and are two-fold.  First, he argues that class counsel was deficient for failing to 
conduct adequate discovery before settling the Collado-Fixler action.  Second, he argues 
that the “unfair, unreasonable, and inadequate” Settlement Agreement supports a claim of 
13 
 
inadequate representation, and demonstrates that the named plaintiffs and class counsel 
did not vigorously represent the interests of the class. 
   a. Guedalia’s Challenge to the Adequacy of Discovery 
 Guedalia’s claim of inadequate representation for failure to conduct sufficient 
discovery fails because the issue was presented to, and resolved by, the California 
District Court.  As we explained in In re Diet Drugs,  
No collateral review is available when class members have had a full and 
fair hearing and have generally had their procedural rights protected during 
the approval of the Settlement Agreement.  Collateral review is only 
available when class members are raising an issue that was not properly 
considered by the District Court at an earlier stage in the litigation. 
 
 431 F.3d at 146.  Guedalia raised the same issue regarding the adequacy of discovery in 
his objection to the Settlement Agreement.  He argued that discovery in the Collado-
Fixler action had only occurred for two months, was limited to discovery relating to class 
certification, and that therefore, any settlement was premature and inappropriate.  In its 
Final Approval of Settlement, issued after the fairness hearing, the California District 
Court considered the arguments raised by the objectors and rejected them.  The court 
explained: 
Some discovery has taken place, the parties have propounded and 
responded to interrogatories, and Plaintiffs’ counsel appear to have a firm 
grasp on the strengths and weaknesses of the case.  Given counsel’s 
substantial experience with class action settlements and opinion that the 
settlement is in the best interest of the class, the Court likewise agrees.   
 
(App. 596.)  The California District Court also considered the costs of additional 
discovery and litigation, and determined that “[t]he potential costs of continuing the 
14 
 
lawsuit could greatly overshadow any judgment Plaintiffs may be able to recover.”  
(Id.)
12
  Because the extent of discovery conducted was “properly considered by the 
District Court at an earlier stage in the litigation,” we will not revisit that issue on 
collateral review.  See In re Diet Drugs, 431 F.3d at 146.   
b. Guedalia’s Challenge to the Fairness of the Settlement 
Agreement 
 
 Guedalia also argues that the settlement was “[u]nfair, inadequate, and 
unreasonable,” which he claims is clear evidence that the named plaintiffs and class 
counsel “failed to prosecute the action with due diligence and reasonable prudence.”  
(Appelants’ Br. 31.)  Because Guedalia’s challenge takes the form of a collateral attack, 
our scope of review is more circumscribed than it would be on direct appeal.  The 
California District Court’s order approving the Settlement Agreement is now final and 
unappealable, and therefore “[a]ny challenges to the [substance] of the [S]ettlement 
[A]greement itself . . . are no longer timely.”  Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 
350 F.3d 360, 363 (3d Cir. 2003).   
Guedalia, under the guise of “adequate representation,” is attempting to challenge 
“the terms of [the] settlement agreement, itself,” which “is clearly inappropriate as it is 
                                                 
12
 We considered a similar argument in In re Prudential Insurance Co. America 
Sales Practices Litigation Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 312 (3d Cir. 1998).  There, an 
objecting plaintiff argued (albeit on direct appeal) that class counsel did not adequately 
represent the interests of the class for failing to take sufficient discovery before entering 
into a settlement agreement.  We found that class counsel adequately represented the 
class and determined that avoiding “expensive and time consuming discovery” was a 
factor that weighed in favor of settling.  Id. at 313, 318.  
15 
 
not a component of a due process challenge, appropriate for collateral attack.”  In re Diet 
Drugs, 431 F.3d at 146, 149.  Had Guedalia wished to challenge the fairness, adequacy, 
and reasonableness of the Settlement Agreement, he could have appealed the Collado-
Fixler action to the Ninth Circuit.  He chose not to do so, and this Court is not the 
appropriate forum in which to litigate those claims.
13
 
Guedalia has not identified a conflict of interest between the named plaintiffs and 
the rest of the class and has not demonstrated that class counsel was unable to adequately 
represent the interests of the class.  He accordingly has not demonstrated a violation of 
the absent class members’ due process rights, and he and the putative class are bound by 
the Settlement Agreement under the principles of res judicata. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Guedalia’s claim relating to the California District Court’s failure to conduct a 
choice of law analysis also lacks merit.  Choice of law is not one of the due process 
considerations we take into account on collateral review of a settlement agreement.  See 
In re Diet Drugs, 431 F.3d at 145 (listing out the three factors — notice, opportunity to 
be heard, and adequate representation — courts analyze to determine whether absent 
plaintiffs received adequate due process).  Moreover, in In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust 
Litigation, we explained that although variations in state laws can present difficulties in 
certifying a litigation class under Rule 23(a), “those variations are irrelevant to [the] 
certification of a settlement class.”  391 F.3d 516, 529 (3d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).  
This is so because unless the differences in state laws are “so significant so as to defeat 
commonality and predominance,” choice of law never becomes an issue in certifying a 
settlement class.  Id. at 529-30.  Guedalia has made no showing, and did not argue before 
the California District Court, that significant variations between California and New 
Jersey law defeated commonality and predominance. 
16 
 
B. Gotthelf’s Individual Claims 
Because Gotthelf opted out of the Settlement Agreement, he is not barred by res 
judicata from pursuing his individual claims for relief.
14
  Gotthelf brings four claims 
under New Jersey law: violations of the NJCFA, common law fraud, breach of express 
warranty, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  For 
substantially the same reasons provided by the District Court, we will affirm the 
dismissal of Gotthelf’s claims.15   
One crucial deficiency in Gotthelf’s pleadings dooms all four of his claims:  
Gotthelf has not alleged any facts that demonstrate that Toyota had knowledge of, and 
intentionally concealed, the alleged defect in the HID headlamps, either before Gotthelf 
                                                 
14
 Because res judicata bars any claims brought on behalf of the putative class, we 
only consider Gotthelf’s claims as to himself.  He has not asserted that he brings his 
claims on behalf of others who opted out of the Settlement Agreement. 
15
 To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”  Id.  In evaluating a motion to dismiss, we accept as true factual assertions in the 
complaint, but we disregard legal conclusions and conclusory statements.  James v. City 
of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 2012).  Moreover, under Rule 9(b), when a 
plaintiff is alleging fraud or mistake, he “must state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake,” though conditions of a person’s mind, such as knowledge 
or intent, may be alleged generally.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  When pleading knowledge, the 
complaint must still contain more than a “conclusory allegation,” and the pleading must 
meet the “less rigid — though still operative — strictures of Rule 8.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
686-87. 
17 
 
leased his Prius, or prior to the expiration of Gotthelf’s 3-year/36,000 mile warranty.  As 
such, each of his claims fails. 
 1. NJCFA 
The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act “provides a private cause of action to 
consumers who are victimized by fraudulent practices in the marketplace.”  Gonzalez v. 
Wilshire Credit Corp., 25 A.3d 1103, 1114 (N.J. 2011).  To constitute consumer fraud, 
“the business practice in question must be ‘misleading’ and stand outside the norm of 
reasonable business practice in that it will victimize the average consumer.”  Turf 
Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp., 655 A.2d 417, 430 (N.J. 1995).  The 
elements of a NJCFA claim are: “(1) an unlawful practice, (2) an ascertainable loss, and 
(3) a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss.”  
Gonzalez, 25 A.3d at 1115.  The statute defines an “unlawful practice” as:  
any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, 
false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, 
suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely 
upon such concealment, suppression[,] or omission, in connection with the 
sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the 
subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any 
person has in fact been misled, deceived[,] or damaged thereby. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2.  Gotthelf claims that the “unlawful practice” in which Toyota 
engaged was its knowing concealment of the defect in the HID headlamps.  Gotthelf also 
claims that Toyota engaged in “an unconscionable commercial practice” by failing to 
disclose the defect in the HID headlamps to its customers once it became aware of the 
defect.  Under each of these theories, however, Gotthelf is required to show that Toyota 
18 
 
“knowingly, with the intent of inducing reliance, conceal[ed], suppress[ed], or omitt[ed] a 
material fact.”  Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 59 A.3d 561, 571 
(N.J. 2013).   
Gotthelf claims that Toyota knew of the HID headlamp defect “for years while 
Plaintiffs[’] warranties were in full force and effect.”  (Appellants’ Br. 48-49.)   Nothing 
in the Complaint provides factual support for Toyota’s alleged knowledge and 
concealment of the defect, either before Gotthelf leased his Prius, or during Gotthelf’s 
warranty period.  To the contrary, the facts demonstrate that once Toyota became aware 
of the defect during the NHTSA investigation, it initiated a Customer Support program to 
notify customers of the problem with the HID headlamps.  
First, the Complaint alleges that Toyota should have been aware of the HID 
headlamp defect through its own “[b]ooks of [k]nowledge, internal testing, information 
on dealership repair orders, warranty data, [and] records of customer complaints.”  (App. 
86.)  However, Gotthelf provides no factual support for this assertion — he does not state 
when the alleged complaints were received, or to whom at Toyota these alleged 
complaints were sent.  Nor does he provide any facts relating to the alleged books of 
knowledge, internal testing, or dealership repair orders.
16
  Such conclusory allegations are 
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 Gotthelf also claims that, as of September 2009, over 26,000 warranty claims 
had been submitted on the HID headlamps.  However, it is not alleged in the Complaint 
when these warranty claims were filed, and at what point Toyota supposedly had 
knowledge of a widespread defect in the HID headlamps, such that it should have 
notified customers of the alleged defect. 
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insufficient to establish Toyota’s knowledge, and concealment, of the HID headlamp 
defect.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79   
Second, Gotthelf relies on the complaints submitted to the NHTSA to establish 
Toyota’s knowledge, and alleged concealment, of the defect.  The Complaint includes 
several customer complaints filed with the NHTSA, the earliest of which dates to July 1, 
2007.  However, these complaints were filed with the NHTSA, not with Toyota, and the 
NHTSA did not notify Toyota of its investigation until May 6, 2009.  Gotthelf has 
provided no facts to support his assertion that Toyota should have known about the defect 
based on these complaints.  Based on the facts provided in the Complaint, May 6, 2009 is 
the earliest date that knowledge of the alleged defect can be attributed to Toyota.  
However, by this time, Gotthelf’s warranty period had ended. 
Third, the Customer Support letter in no way helps Gotthelf’s argument that 
Toyota had knowledge of, and concealed, the defect.  The Customer Support letter was 
sent after the expiration of Gotthelf’s warranty period and informed customers of the 
problem with the HID headlamps.  Gotthelf’s assertions that the letter was sent in bad 
faith, or as a “cover up,” lack factual support. 
Because Gotthelf cannot demonstrate that Toyota engaged in “an unlawful 
practice” through its alleged omission or concealment of the HID headlamp defect, his 
NJCFA claim fails.
17
 
                                                 
17
 Gotthelf also spends a considerable amount of his brief arguing that the District 
Court erred by requiring that Toyota knew “with certainty” that the HID headlamps 
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 2. Common Law Fraud 
Gotthelf’s common law fraud claim was properly dismissed for substantially the 
same reasons as his NJCFA claim.  The elements of a common law fraud claim under 
New Jersey law are: “(1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; 
(2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other 
person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting 
damages.”  Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 367 (N.J. 1997).  Because 
Gotthelf has not demonstrated that Toyota made any material misrepresentations or 
omissions of material fact, his claim fails. 
 3. Breach of Express Warranty 
Gotthelf’s breach of express warranty claim was also properly dismissed.  The 
Unexpected Extinguishment occurred in Gotthelf’s HID headlamps after the 3-
year/36,000 mile warranty period had elapsed.   
In New Jersey, “[a] breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, 
except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and 
discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action 
accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-
725(2) (emphasis added).  Therefore, if a warranty is a “future performance” warranty, 
“the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.”  Poli v. 
                                                                                                                                                             
would fail.  Because the Complaint has failed to plead facts to establish Toyota’s 
knowledge during the relevant time period, we do not need to address whether the 
District Court erred by requiring a heightened standard. 
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DaimlerChrysler Corp., 793 A.2d 104, 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).  In Poli, the 
court determined that a seven-year/70,000 mile powertrain warranty was a “future 
performance warranty.”  Id. at 108.  The warranty at issue here, for three-years/36,000 
miles, is substantially the same as the one in Poli, and falls within the “future 
performance exception” of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-725(2).  The cause of action did not 
accrue until the defect manifested itself.  Therefore, for statute of limitations purposes, 
the breach of the warranty occurs when the defect manifests itself, not when the defect 
first “exists.”  There is no reason the same rule should not apply when deciding whether 
the defect was covered by the warranty.     
New Jersey courts have intimated that plaintiffs can only recover for breach of 
warranty if the defects were discovered during the warranty period.  Cf. Comm’rs of Fire 
Dist. No. 9 v. Am. La France, 424 A.2d 441, 572 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (“[I]f 
the warranty explicitly extended to future performance of the truck, the four-year 
limitations period did not begin to run until the breach — the paint defect — was or 
should have been discovered by the plaintiff, provided the defect arose within the 
warranty period.” (emphasis added)); ACH Enters. 1. LLC v. Viking Yacht Co., 817 F. 
Supp. 2d 465, 470 (D.N.J. 2011) (“[T]the future performance exception found in N.J.S.A. 
§ 12A:2-725(2) only applies if the defect is discovered during the warranty period.”).  
Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent with the general rule of express warranties.  
See Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 616 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“[T]he general rule, from which we see no reason to deviate, is that an express warranty 
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does not cover repairs made after the applicable time has elapsed.  Thus, latent defects 
discovered after the term of the warranty are not actionable.” (alterations, citations, and 
internal quotations marks omitted)).  Because Gotthelf alleges that the defect manifested 
itself outside the warranty period, he does not state a valid claim for breach of warranty.   
 4. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Finally, Gotthelf has alleged no facts which show that Toyota breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Every contract in New Jersey contains 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  See Kalogeras v. 239 Broad Ave., 
L.L.C., 997 A.2d 943, 953 (N.J. 2010).  “The party claiming a breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing must provide evidence sufficient to support a conclusion that 
the party alleged to have acted in bad faith has engaged in some conduct that denied the 
benefit of the bargain originally intended by the parties.”  Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, 
Inc. v. Route 18 Shipping Cntr. Assocs., 864 A.2d 387, 396 (N.J. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Gotthelf’s warranty agreement with Toyota is a contract.  He 
claims that Toyota breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the warranty 
contract by failing to provide him notice of the defect within the warranty period.  
Because Gotthelf has not shown that Toyota had knowledge of the defect during 
Gotthelf’s warranty period, this claim was properly dismissed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s Order. 
